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CONCEPTUALIZING REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS: COMPLEX 
NETWORKS OF ACTORS AND REGULATORY ROLES 
 
Tetty Havinga* 
 
Abstract 
Food regulation nowadays involves a broad variety of actors, including government agencies 
as well as other stakeholders. In this chapter I explore which actors are involved in private 
and mixed forms of food regulation. This question is important when considering such issues as  
the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of regulatory regimes. I argue that a dichot-
omous distinction between public (governmental) and private (non-governmental) regulation is 
not an adequate conceptualisation for analysing the reconfiguration of relationships between 
the actors involved in food regulation. We need more sophisticated distinctions linking the 
type of actor to the role they play in the regulatory process. I disentangle the regulatory 
process into multiple regulatory roles/actions in order to analyse complex patterns of actor 
involvement in a regulatory regime. 
 
Key words 
Food regulation – regulatory arrangements  - food safety – certification – private regulation 
– governance triangle -– supermarkets – food supply chain – regulatory roles – type of ac-
tors in regulatory arrangements 
Introduction 
The regulation and governance of food has changed dramatically in recent 
decades. Traditional food regulation consisted of national governments enact-
ing food legislation and enforcing compliance with the laws. Several develop-
ments in society have contributed to the emergence of national and transna-
tional private or mixed forms of food regulation.  
Food supply chains are increasingly becoming international. Fresh products 
are sourced all over the world to assure Western consumers a continuous 
stream of fruits and vegetables throughout the year. Many processed food 
products are made up of a variety of ingredients, drawn from all over the 
world. Regulating complex global food supply chains is difficult for national 
governments since their jurisdiction is limited to their own national territory. 
Food safety issues has been transformed from a predominantly neutral, 
technical issue that is the preserve of food experts into a contested political 
                                         
*  The author thanks Frans van Waarden, Jaap van der Kloet and the participants in the 
Regulating Food Safety and Quality Stream at the Regulation in the Age of Crisis Third 
Biennial Conference of the Standing Group on Regulatory Governance of the European 
Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), June 17-19 2010, Dublin for their comments on 
earlier drafts of this chapter. 
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matter that is debated in parliament, on television and in the newspapers. Food 
scares and incidents such as mad cow disease (BSE), contaminated milk, and 
EHEC have received wide media attention. The risks connected with food have 
become increasingly visible. 
Traditional government food regulation was perceived as no longer ade-
quate , similarly to government regulation in other domains. Traditional regula-
tion is believed to be ineffective and inflexible, while it disregards the respon-
sibilities of citizens and organizations. The way both the UK government and 
the EU handled the BSE crisis is often cited as a turning point, which demon-
strated an urgent need to transform food regulation. 
These social developments resulted in a shift towards private and mixed 
forms of regulation and a shift from national government regulation towards 
European Union regulation. In an attempt to restore consumer confidence and 
to retain export markets, governments in Brussels and the EU member states 
enacted stricter food safety regulations and reorganized the government food 
safety system. Food producers and suppliers expressly bore primary responsi-
bility for food safety while national governments became responsible for con-
trolling the adequacy of risk control mechanisms of companies in a food chain. 
As a result of their legal responsibility and from a fear of potential damage to 
their reputation in case unsafe food products should find their way to market, 
the food industry and food retailers developed initiatives to decrease food 
safety risks and increase consumer confidence in safe food.  
These reforms involved the emergence of new forms of food regulation, in-
cluding transnational private food standards, corporate social responsibility 
initiatives, and codes of conduct. These transformations involve a new relation-
ship and a changed distribution of responsibilities between government bodies 
on the one side and private actors on the other. New forms of food regulation 
are characterised by a less dominant role for the government and more re-
sponsibilities for private actors (Havinga 2006, Henson and Humphrey 2011, 
Marsden et al. 2010, Oosterveer 2005). These new forms of food regulation 
include both public actors and also private actors, such as firms, NGOs and 
other organisations both inside and outside the food production chain. Govern-
ment regulation is moving from a prescriptive, command-and-control system 
towards an enforced self-regulatory approach (Braithwaite 1982, Hutter 
2011, Martinez et al. 2007) in which the government lays down broad stan-
dards and leaves it to companies to develop, implement and monitor risk man-
agement systems. An example is the European Food Law, which requires all 
food businesses to have controls that demonstrate that they manage food 
safety risks. 
Recent trends are the emergence of retailer-led food governance and 
global coalitions for setting food safety standards, an increased use of global 
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business-to-business standards and third party certification (Fulponi 2006, Har-
rison 1997, Hatanaki and Busch 2008, Havinga 2006, Marsden et al. 2000, 
2010). Another trend is the increase of consumer hallmarks for ‘new’ issues, such 
as animal welfare, fair trade, sustainability, healthy food, and halal food. 
Marsden et al. (2010) describe the new situation as the Public-Private 
Model of Food Regulation. 
Various forms of food regulation 
Regulation is a means for controlling harm in the public interest in order to pro-
tect consumers, citizens and the environment (Hutter 2011: 10). Henson and 
Caswell (1999) distinguish between direct and indirect regulation of food 
safety (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Types of regulation of food safety 
Source 
of the 
rules  
Character of the rules 
Direct Indirect 
 
Public 
 
Dutch Commodities Act 
(Warenwet)1 
UK 1990 Food Safety Act 
EU General Food Law2 
Product liability 
law3 
TBT-GATT agree-
ment4 
Hybrid 
Public-
private 
 
Industrial code of hygienic 
practice 
 
Liability insurance 
policy 
 
 
Private 
 
 
Private food safety certifi-
cation scheme (GlobalGap, 
MSC) 
 
Food company com-
plaints procedure  
 
 
Direct regulation entails obligatory prescriptions and requirements for the pro-
duction and handling of food to assure the production of safe food. Even 
though indirect regulation does not provide prescriptions for the production and 
the product, it is nevertheless expected to act as an incentive to implement food 
safety controls indirectly by shifting the cost-benefit balance or imposing proc-
ess requirements. For example, liability law is assumed to promote food safety 
by encouraging producers to do their best to produce safe products (Havinga 
                                         
1  Dutch Law of 19 September 1919 (Stb. 581, latest change Stb. 2001, 601). 
2  Regulation EC no. 178/2002 of 28 January 2002 laying down the General Principles 
and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety Authority and 
Laying down procedures in matters of food safety. Official Journal of the European 
Communities 2002 L31/1-24. 
3  Art. 185-193 bk 6 BW. 
4  GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). 
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2010). A food company’s consumer complaint procedure is an example of pri-
vate, indirect regulation because the expectation is that learning from com-
plaints will increase the product’s quality. Direct regulation is intended to pro-
vide food safety whereas indirect regulation may aim at increasing food 
safety; however, a contribution to food safety may also be an unintended de 
facto effect. 
Until recently, most research on food safety has focused on direct forms of 
food safety regulation. Recently, however, not only public regulatory arrange-
ments but also private forms of direct food safety regulation have started to 
attract attention (Fuchs et al 2011, Fulponi 2006, Havinga 2006, Henson and 
Reardon 2005, Marsden et al. 2000, 2010, Martinez et al. 2007, Rothstein 
2005, Van Waarden 2006).  
This paper deals with two questions in the context of the reconfiguration of 
the relationships between the various actors: which actors are involved in the 
new food regulatory arrangements? And what roles do these actors play?  
 
Public and private actors in regulatory arrangements 
Some authors only distinguish between public and private actors (e.g. Spruyt 
2001; Josling, Roberts and Orden 2004: 156), state and non-state actors or 
government and non-government actors. Daniel Stewart (2010) implicitly dis-
tinguishes state actors from non-state actors in his analysis of the availability of 
judicial review to actions of non-state actors. Bingen and Busch (2006: 246) 
observe ‘a constantly evolving and changing global network of relationships 
among public and private, mandatory, voluntary, and national and interna-
tional standards bodiesinstead of neatly delineated public and private respon-
sibilities’. 
Several authors on environmental regulation and sustainability have re-
placed this public-private dichotomy by the following threefold classification: 
state, market and civil society. In their analysis of non-state, market-driven 
governance systems, Bernstein and Cashore (2007: 356) and Abbott and Sni-
dal (2009a, 2009b) distinguish between two types of non-state actors: firms 
and NGOs. A similar threefold classification is made by Levi-Faur (2010), who 
distinguishes between civil, market, and state actors. For Levi-Faur a non gov-
ernmental organization can be controlled by civil society actors (CiNGO), mar-
ket actors (MaNGO), or state actors (GoNGO). ‘This distinction between dif-
ferent types of NGOs which act as regulators will allow us to develop a clear-
er understanding of hybrid designs of regulatory institutions.’ Because of the 
ambivalent definition of NGO I prefer to speak of civil actors (alongside gov-
ernment or state actors and firms or market actors). 
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Figure 2: Threefold classifications of actors in regulation 
Abbott & Snidal 
2009  
Levi-Faur 2010  Marsden et all 
2010 
States  State actors  Policy & regulatory interests  
Firms  Market actors  Private interests  
NGOs  Civil actors  Consumer & social interests  
 
The Governance Triangle 
Abbott and Snidal (2009a) visualize the variety of regulatory standard-setting 
(RSS) in their Governance Triangle (see figure 3). They distinguish three groups 
of actors directly involved in RSS: states, firms and NGOs. Abbott and Snidal 
consider RSS rules to be a form of regulation, even though they are voluntary 
(that is not legally mandatory). 
 
Figure 3: The governance triangle (Abbott and Snidal 2009a, 50) 
 
 
The seven zones in the triangle indicate the three forms of single-actor stan-
dards (1-3), three forms of dual-actor standards (4-6) and one form involving 
direct participation of all three groups of actors (7). Abbott and Snidal in-
cluded only four regulatory food standards in their governance triangle5; in 
                                         
5  Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 1997, Max Havelaar (MH) 1988 (fair trade coffee) 
and International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) 1972 (organic 
→ 
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another publication they include another two food standards6. Further food 
standards could easily be included. Most food regulatory arrangements are 
situated in zone 1 (state regulation) and zone 2 (industrial self-regulation). 
Abbott and Snidal show the evolution of the governance triangle (see fig-
ure 4). In the pre-1985 period there are only a few RSS schemes, mostly in 
Zone 1 (state). The decade between 1985 and 1994 shows the emergence of 
RSS schemes, especially firm-schemes, as well as the first multi-stakeholder and 
NGO schemes. The post-1994 period shows a continued proliferation of firm 
schemes and an increasing number of NGO schemes as well as the emergence 
of collaborative schemes (NGOs and firms or tripartite, zone 6 and 7). 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of the governance triangle over time 
 
 
From Abbott and Snidal 2009a: 53. 
 
The governance triangle is useful for analyzing changes in regulatory stand-
ards over time or to compare regulatory arrangements between different sec-
tors or countries. Food regulatory schemes are dominated by state regulation 
(zone 1) and by firm schemes (zone 2). This applies particularly to food safety 
standards. The food standards that involve civil actors are mainly concerned 
with other issues such as sustainability or fair trade, but it is quite possible that 
civil actors will become more important in food regulation in the future. We can 
already witness an increase in the numbers of these actors in the regulatory 
                                         
food), all three in zone 6 (dual-actor standards with involvement of firms and NGOs) 
and WHO Code of Marketing for Breast-milk Substitutes (BM) 1981 in zone 1 (state 
standard).  
6  GlobalGap 1997 and SQF 1994 (SafeQualityFood), Abbott and Snidal 2009b: 513, 
both in zone 2. 
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domain, devoted to social interests (e.g. fair trade), environmental interests 
(e.g. organic food), or animal welfare (e.g. free-range meat).7 It remains to be 
seen whether future regulation in this field will develop in the way Abbott and 
Snidal sketch out. 
However, an analysis focused on actor types also has its drawbacks. Let us 
look at the example of GlobalGAP (Global Partnership for Good Agricultural 
Practices). GlobalGAP is a private sector body originally set up by European 
supermarkets chain to set standards for the certification of agricultural products 
around the globe. GlobalGap is classified as a single-actor standard in the 
Governance triangle (Zone 2). In fact, however, GlobalGap is not a single-
actor standard, but a standard set by actors from one single category of ac-
tors (firms). Multiple actors are involved in GlobalGap, all with very different 
positions and interests. GlobalGap is a membership organization with three 
different types of members: retail and food service members, produc-
er/supplier members and associate members such as certification bodies, con-
sultancies and the crop protection industry. Conflicts of interest exist within the-
se member categories, for example between multinational supermarket corpo-
rations and small local retailers or between aquaculture industries in Norway 
and Thailand. Moreover, other stakeholders such as environmental NGOs, sci-
entific experts or government officials are also involved in working groups or 
meetings of GlobalGap. 
The focus on actor types in the regulatory triangle neglects that a ‘single-
actor standard’ might involve multiple actors with conflicting interests. Further-
more, retail food standards (e.g. the British Retail Consortium Global Stan-
dards), halal certification (e.g. the quality system of the Halal Correct Certifi-
cation Foundation) and traditional industrial self-regulation (e.g. the South Af-
rica Olive Commitment to Compliance scheme or the Unilever Supplier Qualifi-
cation System) are Zone 2 standards in the governance triangle, just like 
GlobalGap, although they differ significantly in terms of the actors involved. 
We should therefore differentiate between various actors. 
Authors on food regulation tend to focus less on NGOs or civil society than 
do authors on environmental regulation, probably because civil society actors 
do not play a significant role in many food regulatory arrangements. Because 
of this, I neglected to include civil society organisations in an analysis of shifts in 
food safety regulation (Havinga 2006). However, in the field of food safety it 
is particularly important to distinguish between different types of private ac-
tors, so I distinguished three important institutional actors in this field: state 
(government agencies), industry (food industry and farmers) and third parties8 
                                         
7  See footnote 6 for some examples of zone 6 standards.  
8  This concept of ‘third party’ differs from the concept of Levi-Faur. 
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(private auditing and certification organisations, retailers and consumer organi-
sations) (Havinga 2006). Fuchs et al. (2011, 360) stress the importance of re-
tailers in food regulation when they distinguish four types of stakeholders in 
private retail food standards: 1) retailers, 2) producers: food industry, grow-
ers, fishers, 3) certification bodies and 4) civil society and NGOs. 
Dilling et al. (2008: 3-4) distinguish three actor constellations from which 
the para-legal systems of the business world emerge: single enterprises (corpo-
rate self-responsibility), transnational corporate networks, and non-govern-
mental organisation- business partnerships. 
Analysing networks and production chains 
In another body of literature, authors on food regulation do analyse the net-
works or production chains connected to a particularly regulatory regime.  
Marsden et al. (2010: 120) distinguish between three types of interest in 
the new hybrid food policy-formation network:  
1.  policy and regulatory interests,  
2.  private interests, and  
3.  consumer and social interests.  
 
These types of interest correspond to the three actor categories in the regulato-
ry triangle proposed by Abbott and Snidal (state, firms, NGOs, see figure 2). 
Marsden et al. (2010: 283, italics in original, 290) argue that ‘it is the interac-
tions between public and private actors that are essential to a fuller under-
standing of the food system’ and the boundaries between public, private and 
civil society interests become less clear with time. Other authors also observe 
the blurring of the public-private distinction and the rise of hybrid organisations 
and networks combining government and non-governmental actors (e.g. Bingen 
and Busch 2006, Black 2002, Havinga 2006, Hutter 2011, Levi-Faur 2010). 
In their analysis of the new regulation and governance of food, Marsden et 
al. pay attention to a variety of actors such as UK and EU government bodies, 
corporate retailers, farmers, producers, manufacturers, global standard-setting 
organisations, private certification bodies, logistic firms, environmental and so-
cial NGOs. They paint a picture of various complex networks involving many 
organisations and regulations (see figure 5, for example).  
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Figure 5 Regulation in the supply chain and the role of different global organiza-
tions9 
 
From Marsden, Lee, Flynn and Thankappan 2010: 280. 
 
Bush and Oosterveer (2007: 391) describe export firms as key actors in the 
shrimp trade, linking local producers in Thailand and Vietnam with global trade 
networks. They conclude that certification bodies are unable to audit the chain 
below the level of exporters, where capital and information flow through in-
formal, diffuse trade networks. This governance arrangement involves a com-
plex mix of state and non-state actors: bureaucrats, retailers, wholesalers, im-
                                         
9  BRC (British Retail Consortium), EurepGap (Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group Good 
Agricultural Practice), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation), FSA (Food Standards 
Agency), HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Point), IFS (International Food Standards), 
IPPC (International Plant Protection Convention), OIE (Organisation Mondiale de la Santé 
Animale/ World Organisation for Animal Health), SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures), SQF (Safe Quality Food), WHO (World Health Organisation), WTO (World 
Trade Organisation). 
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porters and exporters, local trade network, producers, NGOs, processing com-
panies and consumers.  
In a study of public-private protection of forests and fish (Forest Steward-
ship Council and Marine Stewardship Council), Van Waarden (2010) points to 
the involvement of a wide range of actors from all phases in the value chain, 
with different interests, as one of the factors contributing to the success of these 
schemes: small scale and large fisheries, fishery associations and cooperatives, 
suppliers, manufacturers , distribution, retailers, scientists, indigenous people’s 
organisations, fishery communities, and environmental groups. 
To conclude, the broad threefold categorisation of actors involved in regu-
lation (state actors, firms and civil society) is useful in analysing the balance 
between these three actor types in comparative perspective, whether historical, 
as Abbot and Snidal do, or when comparing countries, industries or fields of 
regulation. However, a more sophisticated categorisation of firms is needed for 
analysing the involvement of actors in non-governmental and hybrid systems of 
food regulation. Consider three private food regulatory regimes: GlobalGap, 
BRC, and a Dutch Halal certification scheme. All three would be classified as 
firm schemes in zone 2 according to Abbott and Snidal. Yet the three are only 
similar in some ways. When analysing the effectiveness and legitimacy of a 
regulatory regime it is important to distinguish between non-governmental ac-
tors which are regulated (regulatees), non-governmental actors which are part 
of the production chain but are not regulated themselves by the regulation un-
der consideration (such as suppliers and retailers), and non-governmental ac-
tors providing services to the regulated industry (such as certification and audit-
ing organisations).10 The increasing role of transnational and international gov-
ernment bodies in food regulation means it is inevitable also to distinguish be-
tween different levels of state actors. Following Marsden et al. (2010), civil 
society interests can be broken down into social interests (e.g. child labour, fair 
trade, occupational health, public health), environmental interests (e.g. biodi-
versity, sustainability, insecticides) and consumer interests (e.g. food safety, 
food security, choice and price).11 Figure 6 provides a survey of these distinc-
tions. 
 
  
                                         
10  Havinga 2008. 
11  Animal rights groups do not fit into this categorization very well. 
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Figure 6 Types of actors involved in regulation and their position in the supply 
chain 
Type of 
actor 
 Position in 
regula-
tion/supply 
chain 
Actor role 
State  - transnational 
level 
- (federal) 
level 
- state level 
- local level 
 
Non-
state/priv
ate 
Mar-
ket/firms 
Inside regu-
lated supply 
chain 
- Regulatees 
- Associations 
of regulated 
industry 
- Firms up- or 
downstream 
in supply 
chain not tar-
get of regula-
tion at hand 
Outside regu-
lated supply 
chain 
- Providing ser-
vices (e.g. 
standard set-
ting, auditing, 
certification, 
disinfectants, 
education, 
consultancy) 
Civil soci-
ety 
(NGOs) 
 - Social interest 
groups 
- Environmental 
interest 
groups 
- Consumer in-
terest groups 
Regulatory roles 
Traditional Command-and-Control regulation is conceptualised as state legisla-
tion. However, a regulatory regime comprises not only legislation and other 
rules. Picciotto (2002) conceptualised regulation as consisting of three elements: 
rule-making, monitoring compliance, and enforcement (Scott 2002, Havinga 
2006, Levi-Faur 2010).  
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Levi-Faur (2010) distinguishes further between three roles: regulator, 
regulatee, and third party12. Combining these three roles with three actor 
types, he distinguishes 27 types of third party regulatory designs (see figure 
7). 
 
Figure 7 Types of Third party regulatory designs (Levi-Faur) 
 
From Levi-Faur, David (2010) ‘Regulation and Regulatory Governance’, Jerusalem Papers in 
Regulation & Governance 1 (regulation.huji.ac.il) 
 
Mattli and Woods (2009) include implementation in their definition of regula-
tion: ‘the organisation and control of economic, political, and social activities by 
means of making, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing of rules.’ Adding 
implementation implies that we should consider the regulatees as part of the 
regulatory regime. 
                                         
12  Levi-Faur 2010 distinguishes three main strategies in regulation: 1. first party regulation: 
Regulator=regulatee (self-regulation), 2. second party regulation: regulator independent 
of regulatee (e.g. state regulation of business, or retailer imposing regulation on suppli-
ers), 3. third party regulation – relationship between regulator and regulatee is mediat-
ed by a third party as independent auditor (e.g. EurepGAP).  
 The meaning of the concepts ‘first party’, ‘second party’ and ‘third party’ is not consist-
ently used in the literature. E.g. Van Waarden 2012: first party = self-regulation by ac-
tor, second party = actor involved in transaction imposing standards, third party = inde-
pendent actor not involved in transaction; Bingen and Busch 2006 : first party = supplier, 
second party = buyer, third party = independent third assessing compliance, fourth par-
ty = state/regulatory agency. Havinga (2006) categorized retailers setting food safety 
standards for their suppliers as third party regulation.  
 
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2012/01 
 
 
15 
 
For Abbott and Snidal (2009a: 63) the regulatory process comprises five 
main stages (or five tasks): 
1.  Agenda-setting (placing an issue on the regulatory agenda) 
2. Negotiation (negotiating, drafting and promulgating standards) 
3. Implementation (implementing standards within the operations of targets of 
regulation such as firms) 
4. Monitoring compliance 
5. Enforcement (promoting compliance and responding to non-compliance) 
 
Agenda-setting is added to rule-making. Abbott and Snidal use the abbrevia-
tion ANIME to refer to these five stages. 
In my examination of private forms of food regulation such as GlobalGap 
and BRC, there seems to be one important phase missing in ANIME. In tradi-
tional command-and-control regulation, after making the rules, the next phase 
is implementing the rules. However, in private regulation drafting and promul-
gating the rules is not enough. Rules from GlobalGap or BRC, for instance, are 
not just being implemented in farms or the food industry. It seems to be crucial 
that these rules were first promoted and eventually made mandatory by domi-
nant market parties such as big supermarket chains. 
Regulatees have to accept or adopt a regulation. Adopting a regulation 
means deciding to accept the rules and to aim at compliance. By and large, an 
organization may adopt a regulation because it is legally mandatory, because 
compliance with the regulation is an obligation imposed by a dominant actor in 
the market (such as the combined retailers) or because the regulatee considers 
adoption beneficial for some reason (e.g. improving reputation, market share, 
price). Henson and Humphrey meet this objection by including adoption in the 
five functions involved in making a food standard operational: standard-
setting, adoption, implementation, conformity assessment and enforcement 
(2011: 155-156). They are right to argue that the distinction between stand-
ard setting and adoption clarifies the issue of compulsion and obligation.13 
Conclusions 
When I started working on this paper, my purpose was just to add some dis-
tinctions of actors to the three main actor types (state, firm, NGO) and to in-
clude some regulatory activities among the three elements of regulation (rule 
                                         
13  Both Meidinger and Van Waarden distinguish different functions for certification 
schemes. Van Waarden (2010) distinguishes three main functions for a certification 
standard organization such as FSC and MSC: standard setting, accreditation, and 
trademark assurance. Meidinger arrives at four functions: standard setting, certifying 
compliance, accrediting certifiers and labelling products (2008: 265). 
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making, monitoring and enforcement). However, my work on the paper, which 
involved reading and rereading the literature, revealed the high level of com-
plexity of regulation. Many distinctions are only important in the context of 
particular regulatory arrangements or a particular inquiry. Besides, it often is 
more important to know whether the different tasks or functions (e.g. drafting 
the rules, adopting the rules, implementing the rules, assessing conformity and 
enforcing compliance) are carried out by the same organisation or by three or 
more different organisations than to know that all tasks are carried out by 
market actors (making this a single-actor regulation in the governance triangle). 
Black (2008) sees accountability problems because regulatory roles and 
responsibilities are distributed among several actors (deciding on goals, draft-
ing standard, monitoring, enforcement). It is impossible to call a standard-setter 
to account for enforcement of the rules or to call the enforcer to account for 
rules he did not make. Black (2008) asks, ‘How to call to account a constellation 
of regulators?’  
To make it even more complex: the involvement of actors and the roles they 
perform develop over time. Bernstein and Cashore (2007) showed for non-
state, market-driven governance systems that political legitimacy is constructed 
in a three-phase process with different relationships between the actors and 
participation of different actors. Bernstein and Cashore distinguish between the 
initiation phase, the phase of widespread support and the phase of political 
legitimacy. A picture of the actors and roles involved in Eurepgap in 1997 dif-
fers significantly from the picture of GlobalGap in 2010 (Van der Kloet and 
Havinga 2008, Van der Kloet 2011). The picture will be different again at 
some other moment in time. 
Five main functions seem to apply to every regulatory arrangement. These 
functions are similar to the functions Henson and Humphrey (2011) distinguish 
for food standards, but are worded slightly differently to make them universal-
ly applicable. For a regulatory arrangement to be effective, rules have to be 
laid down and subsequently adopted and implemented, and compliance with 
the rules has to be monitored and enforced. All regulatory activities can be 
thought of as part of one of these functions.  
1. Standard setting (rule making) 
2. Adoption 
3. Implementation 
4. Monitoring compliance (assessing conformity) 
5. Enforcement 
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Figure 8 Catalogue of regulatory activities connected to five main functions 
Actions Sideline actions 
I. Rule making14 
1. First step (initiator) agenda 
setting 
2. Determine goals of regulation 
3. Negotiation about the rules 
4. Drafting the rules 
5. Lay down the rules (decide on 
and promulgating the rules) 
6. Further regulations and imple-
menting rules 
- Lobbying 
- Risk assessment 
- Mobilizing resistance or support 
- Adapting the rules (to new situations 
and acquired experience) 
II. Adoption15 
7. Adopting the rules 
8. Imposing the rules on suppliers 
or other actors in the supply 
chain (make the rules compul-
sory for other actors) 
- Promoting and supporting the 
rules 
- Education & coaching 
- Facilitating 
III. Implementation 
9. Implementing rules within firms 
(or other targets of regula-
tion/regulatees) 
- Promoting and supporting the 
rules 
- Education & coaching 
- Facilitating 
IV. Monitoring16 
10. Testing 
11. Inspection 
12. Audit, verification 
13. Certification  
14. Documentation 
15. Tracing non-compliant and un-
desirable behaviour  
- Accreditation certification 
bodies 
- Trademark assurance 
- Evaluation and adaptation of 
monitoring strategy 
V. Enforcement 
16. Sanctioning non-compliance 
(warning, fine, withdrawal cer-
tificate) 
17. Legal enforcement (prosecu-
tion, civil law claim, appeal) 
- Accreditation of certification 
bodies 
- Trademark assurance 
- Developing instruments and 
strategy in response to non 
compliance 
- Evaluation and adaptation of 
enforcement strategy 
 
 
                                         
14  These activities may repeat on another level, e.g. EU, Member states, agency and so on 
and after some time in the future. 
15  These activities may repeat up- or downstream in the food chain when requirements are 
passed on: e.g. supermarket – manufacturer – import firm – export firm – farmer. 
16  Monitoring is a continuous process. 
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We need to analyse particular regulatory regimes and establish which actors 
are involved, how they are interrelated and what role they play. A crude dis-
tinction between three parties -- state , market and civil society -- masks inter-
dependence, conflicts of interest and power. Knowledge of which particular 
actors are involved and what their role is in the regulatory social field reveals 
power relations that may have an effect on the reliability of a certificate, the 
level of compliance with prescriptions, and the openness of decision making. 
These insights might trigger government agencies to interfere or to monitor 
more actively. 
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